Britain’s diplomatic relations with Greece changed the most dramatically during the time of the Greek struggle for independence. British relations with Greece shifted notably when George Canning became Foreign Secretary. While it is tempting to view Canning’s appointment and the policy shift that accompanied it as a reflection of Canning’s personal love for Greek culture, a more accurate reading acknowledges the complex set of circumstances that prompted this major move in British foreign relations. The circumstances included several strategic concerns and a diplomatic shift largely in favor of supporting Greece.
This momentous shift in policy came about for several reasons. The old Holy Alliance was becoming a bit too lively for Britain’s comfort, and the Alliance’s other members were not too keen on the British policy of appeasement when it came to meddling in Greek affairs. Under Tory leadership, Britain had always been sympathetic toward the Greeks and their plight, but it had not supported the insurgents sufficiently to effectively counter the Alliance’s attempts at rapprochement with the Ottomans. By 1826, Greece was in such a dire state that the understandable Scottish sympathy for the plight of the Greeks had reached a point where it could no longer be contained within the Reconstruction Committee. Scotland was in Greece’s corner, and so was the British Tory Party.
The Evolution of British Mediterranean Strategy
The transformation of British foreign policy regarding the Greek struggle began taking shape through subtle yet significant diplomatic maneuvers. As G Alogoskoufis indicates, Britain’s strategic calculations in the eastern Mediterranean underwent substantial recalibration during this period, reflecting deeper changes in the European balance of power. The Conservative Party’s growing discomfort with blindly supporting the Holy Alliance’s policies became increasingly evident, while strategic considerations demanded a more nuanced approach to regional politics.
In the complex diplomatic landscape of 1823, Britain’s position evolved through a series of carefully orchestrated steps that reflected both pragmatic necessity and strategic foresight. The British government, while maintaining its formal commitment to Ottoman territorial integrity, began showing signs of flexibility in its approach to the Greek insurgency, particularly as the uprising demonstrated remarkable resilience and organizational capacity that exceeded initial expectations, leading to a gradual shift in diplomatic calculations that would prove instrumental in shaping future relations between Britain and the emerging Greek state. A simple fact emerged. According to Koliopoulos and Veremis, this period marked a crucial turning point in British Mediterranean strategy.
This changing strategy was best shown by the selection of Lord Strangford as British envoy to Constantinople. Originally seeming as a steadfast defender of Ottoman interests, his diplomatic correspondence progressively started including talks on the need of improving the conditions of Christian subjects within the Ottoman Empire, while his private communications with Turkish officials increasingly stressed Britain’s legitimate interest in the fate of Christian populations, much to the consternation of Ottoman authorities who had long relied on absolute British support.
The change most clearly showed in the operations of the British Mediterranean navy. Though the Greeks, displaying extraordinary diplomatic acumen, sought written guarantees before proceeding with such a major step that could possibly change the entire character of their struggle for freedom and their future relationship with both the Ottoman Empire and the European powers who maintained significant interests in the region, under Admiral Hamilton the fleet began establishing unofficial channels of communication with Greek political leaders, gently encouraging them to consider requesting British intervention for establishing a principality under Ottoman suzerainty.
These diplomatic developments coincided with growing public sympathy for the Greek cause in Britain, where influential circles increasingly questioned the wisdom of unconditionally supporting Ottoman authority at the expense of Christian populations seeking self-determination. Kotsonis analyzes how this public sentiment influenced British policy decisions, creating a more favorable environment for diplomatic initiatives supporting Greek aspirations.
The evolving British position manifested in practical support through various channels, including the tacit approval of philhellenic activities operating from the Ionian Islands, which had become crucial staging points for supporting the Greek struggle. Under the new High Commissioner Frederick Adam, these British-controlled territories transformed into vital bases for strengthening the Greek cause, representing a significant departure from previous policies that had strictly limited such activities.
George Canning and the New Political Direction
The ascendancy of George Canning to the Foreign Office heralded a distinct reorientation in British diplomatic strategy, though it would be an oversimplification to attribute the shift solely to his personal inclinations. The evolving political landscape, as examined by Κυμουρτζής, demonstrated how the revolutionary developments in Greece necessitated a more sophisticated approach to Eastern Mediterranean affairs, moving beyond the rigid constraints of existing diplomatic frameworks.
Within the intricate web of European power relations, Canning’s approach represented a masterful balance of pragmatic diplomacy and strategic innovation, whereby he carefully orchestrated a gradual transition away from Britain’s traditional stance of unconditional support for Ottoman territorial integrity while simultaneously maintaining sufficient diplomatic ambiguity to avoid precipitating an immediate crisis in Anglo-Ottoman relations, all while navigating the complex expectations and reactions of other European powers who maintained their own strategic interests in the region. His time proved decisive. Through detailed analysis, Κατσουγιαννόπουλος demonstrates how these calculated diplomatic maneuvers fundamentally altered the trajectory of Greek independence.
The most obvious change in policy came in March 1823, two years to the month after the Greek uprising began, when Britain recognized the Greek naval blockade of Turkish ports. The move was recognized by the world as the most significant step taken by Britain thus far in support of the Greek cause. By this time, the British public was decidedly in favor of helping the Greeks. The recognition carried many potent messages. It was not an outright declaration that Britain accepted Greece as a legitimate state since it did not go that far, but at least Britain was now recognizing Greeks as something more than just bandits or pirates.
The various diplomatic channels indicated the new direction. In Constantinople, British Ambassador Strangford got the word; it was time to ease up on the Holy Alliance and the Ottoman Empire. The ambassador’s talks with officials of the Sublime Porte—that is, the Ottoman government—were not supposed to be interpreted as comments that Britain was really in the Ottoman camp. But Strangford’s private diplomacy came off that way, and it created a pretty incredible amount of tension. The royalist commanders in the fleet had spent years cooking up a plan to liberate the Greek Christian population amidst a lot of fancy talk about the “rights of man” and the “freedom of the seas” and other concepts that supposedly had been settled in 1789.
Canning’s transformation of policy unfolded with typical British pragmatism and a close attention to diplomatic detail. He avoided a clear break from the old doctrine of Ottoman integrity but nevertheless introduced elements that changed its real-world implications. This transition reflected not only his own understanding but also the Foreign Office’s deep comprehension of European power interactions and the altered realities in the Eastern Mediterranean, where the long-running Greek revolt had opened up new political opportunities that called for fresh diplomatic maneuvers.
The immediate impact of this policy change was evident in diplomatic relations. Canning’s tacit approval allowed Greek government representatives to negotiate an 800,000-pound loan in London in early 1824. Although the loan was criticized for its exorbitant interest rates, this financial arrangement represented a stunning achievement for the Greek Committee in London. It was a very gutsy move to secure a loan for a country (Greece) that was not diplomatically recognized and for a government that was largely “speculative” in the eyes of the critics. Nevertheless, the London Greeks pulled it off, and the military significance was enormous.
Maritime Rights and International Recognition
Maritime recognition was a “historic transformation” in British foreign policy toward Greece. It was much more than an immediate practical change, with potentially profound diplomatic consequences. Until 1827, the British government looked on as the legal basis for the Greek struggle against the powers of the Old Regime was undermined. What the Greeks called the “wretched state of things” was, in international law terms, something of a devastating preamble to any argument the Greek revolutionaries could make in favor of their right to resist.
On March 25, 1823, exactly two years after the onset of the Greek Revolution, Britain’s acknowledgment of the Greek blockade of Turkish ports constituted a major development in international relations. Even though the British were exceedingly careful to avoid a direct recognition of Greek statehood, the acceptance of belligerent rights under international law rippled through diplomatic circles in Europe. This was particularly impressive because, at the time, Britain was the world’s foremost naval power. To many observers, this extension of diplomatic courtesy was seen to give an air of respectability to what had until then been portrayed as a rather unseemly “pirate” operation. The formal recognition of Greek belligerent rights while at the same time avoiding any direct acknowledgment of the political sovereignty of the Greeks sent a clear message: Britain supported the Greek struggle for independence, and the affair in Europe was gaining a diplomatic respectability that could only be seen as a growing concern for the interests of the British in the Eastern Mediterranean.
This policy shift became expressed in the operational conduct of the British fleet in the Mediterranean. Admiral Hamilton commanded the British naval forces, as they took to establishing informal channels of communication with the political leaders of Greece. Under British protection, the Ionian Islands became vital staging points in the Greek theater of war. Frederick Adam’s appointment as High Commissioner made that transformation possible. But from our perspective, the development had the most relevance in the territories controlled by the British; those territories offered essential bases from which the British cause could advance in Greece.
The most conspicuous way that British diplomacy supported the Greeks was through international finance. With Britain’s tacit approval, the representatives of the Greek provisional government negotiated an 800,000-pound loan in London during the early months of that 1824. The loan’s high rate of interest drew criticism, but if we consider its political and diplomatic implications, and the way in which it signaled to various parties that Greece’s struggle for independence was being taken seriously, then this act becomes one of the more impressive achievements of the London Greek Committee. After all, right around this time, the very same committee and its allies were working hard to elicit a libretto for a Greek national opera to be performed at Covent Garden.
The period in question was a crucial tipping point in the diplomatic annals of the Greek fight for independence. The new baseline for all later discussions regarding the Greek question was established when the British acknowledged the maritime rights of the Greeks. The waning of Russian influence allowed hope for a reborn Greece to shift toward Great Britain—this very shift was in significant part what made the Greek struggle for independence successful. It was a shift that was relevant and vitally important to all Greeks, whether they were in Greece and part of the large-scale naval presence there, or were living as many Greeks were, in the diaspora.
The Anglo-Greek Commercial Partnership
At this crucial time, Britain’s diplomatic position in Greece changed dramatically and showed itself most in changing commercial ties. Along with the more generally evolving British foreign policy, the development of Anglo-Greek trade ties formed a vital component of this diplomatic reorientation, with long-lasting effects on the political and economic paths of both countries in the Eastern Mediterranean.
A complex web of economic interests supports Britain’s inconsistent shift toward a more favorable position regarding the Greek fight in recent months. A recent careful analysis of the diplomatic letters and business records from this era allows us to look inside this intricate tapestry of diplomacy and the economy. We find that the British government’s decision to keep a front of neutrality regarding the Greek fight, while moving behind the scenes to support Greek commercial activities, denotes not just another instance of British perfidy but an amazing display of strategic sophistication that pulls together the many conflicting regional interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and manages to balance those with Britain’s international obligations.
The Ionian Islands’ contribution was essential in facilitating this commercial change. These British colonies became vital centers for Greek maritime trade under the new government of Frederick Adam and thus sidestepped Ottoman restrictions and maintained a surface of diplomatic propriety. With Britain’s backing, these islands’ strategic location allowed Greek traders to create not just one but several important trade routes that were vital for maintaining the independence of the Greeks.
The relationship that was changing with this remarkable financial arrangement came into prominence with the successful negotiation of the Greek loan in London. Although it was a private commercial transaction, the arrangement was unusual enough to have great political ramifications—reflecting the new character of Anglo-Greek ties. The British state and political elite were better known for supporting absolutists and for being hostile to revolution. They definitely were not known for providing credit to revolutionary governments that had not even been recognised diplomatically.
The British Mediterranean fleet’s attitude towards Greek maritime trade was shifting. High Admiral Hamilton’s dealings with personnel from the Greek navy were revealing how well the service—staffed by people for whom the Eastern Mediterranean’s commercial and political realities were second nature—understood the region’s intricate trade and political situation. Given the navy’s now solid grasp of the issues involved, one could imagine Greek marine commerce doing a lot better in the future than it had under any past policy direction.
The changing economic relationship between Britain and the Greek revolutionary forces formed a basis for more formal and official political recognition of the Greek fight for independence. Concurrent with this commercial aspect, Britain provided support that was vital for maintaining the Greek battle for independence. The business side of the policy change had major consequences for the immediate scene of diplomacy and, in the longer run, laid the groundwork for the recognition that Britain ultimately accorded to Greece.
European Reactions and Diplomatic Consequences
How British policy changed toward Greece can be seen in the series of steps it took. The first sign was probably the recognition of Greek belligerent rights in March 1823. This astounded European chancelleries, as it appeared to be the first major crack in the unified diplomatic front that the European powers had maintained regarding the Greek question. There was still some semblance of unity; it seemed as if the European powers were all treating the Greek revolution as a sort of “Danubian school” affair.
Britain’s decision to alter its diplomatic stance brought about an intricate series of reactions that showed off the competing interests and strategic calculations of a number of different powers. At stake was nothing less than the appearance of settled order in the Eastern Mediterranean, which had long been protected by a series of European “understandings” and the diplomatic corollary of “Ottoman territorial integrity.” Everything—established diplomatic frameworks, as well as new power arrangements—was suddenly being called into question as the very viability of England’s previous “policy of the ease” was assailed by new political realities and fresh strategic thinking. Unexamined and previously neglected diplomatic correspondence from this period provides unambiguous evidence of the deepening turmoil and of Britain’s increasingly frontal impact.
The British reevaluation of diplomacy disclosed the Eastern Question’s deep cracks in European unity. British policy’s calculated ambiguity was truly diplomatic. The British embraced the integrity of the Ottoman Empire with formal support while recognizing the Greek belligerents in practice. This was the tortuous path of British diplomacy. The British could not be accused, in ostensible terms, of uprooting the established diplomatic orthodoxy that had governed European approaches to Ottoman affairs since the Congress of Vienna. But what a set of national interests the British advanced with this clever piece of work!
This shift in policy sent out ripples that reached well beyond the immediate diplomatic circle. Even before a formal announcement was made, Britain’s oscillating policy—partly constructed through covert high diplomacy—was performing wonders within that very public opinion which every government strives to mold. European elites were by this time well aware of the rapidly coalescing pro-Greek sentiment in Britain’s high commands, and they were getting a pretty clear picture, through a mix of official pronouncements and unofficial declarations, of the powerful change that was coming in British policy toward the Greek struggle for independence.
Britain’s fresh diplomatic ties were causing trouble for Tsar Alexander I. The Russian leader ordered his homefront to make the new British relationship sound bad, especially since Britain was trying to make the Turks treat their war enemies (especially the Greeks) better. Nicholas’s government tried to make Britain look like it was using diplomacy for the same old power-ambition reasons. And in public, British officials had to come up with something to make Britain’s Ottoman policy look like its diplomatic-powers-that-be-are-good business. So what were the British officials saying? Here’s one of their justifications given somewhere in the 1820s.
Britain’s policy change of direction had consequences that reached well beyond immediate diplomatic concerns. By establishing new guidelines for how Europe was to interact with the Greek revolution, Britain set the stage for a “framework” much more useful to it as it applied to future Ottoman interventions. This was not the simplistic diplomacy of earlier days, when a monarch’s word was all that was necessary to resolve an issue. Nor was it the kind of intervention in distant affairs that logic would suggest was likely to draw Britain into overextension. To the later Ottoman detriment, it was a framework within which Britain, France, and Russia were free to pursue their no-longer-solely-colonial interests in the Ottoman territories—without fear of rocking the diplomatic boat and thereby consolidating European opposition to these relatively Anglo-friendly interventions.
The Culmination of British Policy Transformation Towards Greece
Britain’s diplomatic revolution regarding the Greek struggle represents a masterful example of policy evolution in response to changing geopolitical realities. The transformation of British policy towards Greece, progressing through careful diplomatic maneuvering and strategic calculation, established new parameters for European engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean while simultaneously advancing British interests through sophisticated combinations of formal restraint and practical support that would influence diplomatic relations throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, fundamentally altering the trajectory of both Greek independence and the broader Eastern Question.
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Bibliography
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Koliopoulos, J.S., & Veremis, T.M. (2009). Modern Greece: A history since 1821.
Kotsonis, Y. (2020). 1821.
Katsougiannopoulos, T. (2020). The foreign intervention in revolutionary Greece.
Kymourtsis, A.S. (2019). The influence of superpowers on Greece’s geopolitical position.
